A Critical Analysis of Procedural Fairness in Disciplinary Proceedings by Justice Dipankar Datta

The Civil Appeal referred to the Supreme Court of India is the culmination of a historical tussle between and on the one hand, Maharana Pratap Singh who was a former Constable in the Dog Squad of the Crime Investigation Department and on the other hand, the Claimants And Respondents in herein, who are all Government of India employees.

This was a critical judgment after the sacking suffered by him in 1996 and after a disciplinary process instigated against him in 1989, turned into a protracted battle of lawsuits. The case brought to the forefront important elements of administrative law especially in regards to the conduct of disciplinary inquiries and the rights of government employees.

The Court went into careful review of the procedural anomalies and the fairness of the dismissal per se, to the point of questioning the validity of the whole process that resulted in termination of the appellant.

The factual background

Maharana Pratap Singh a Constable was posted in 1973 and got two days earnest leave in the month of August 1988 and he was reported back on the 8th Aug 1988. Interestingly, on August 7, 1988, complaints of extortion and cheating were registered via the First Information Report (FIR) against unidentified people.

It was on August 8, 1988 when the appellant, on his way to join duty was given a briefcase by the informant and arrested at the Rajasthan Hotel in Patna, as a result. He was immediately suspended.

On June 14, 1989, disciplinary action against him started in which four counts were charged. His main case accused him of being arrested on a charge of accepting money with regards to a deed of cheating and extortion.

The second count was one that was related to an earlier case committed in the year 1976 where he was convicted of defrauding a manager of a cinema hall through pretending that he was a Sub-Inspector of the CID. All the other charges were based on his failure to report back to duty and report to CID Headquarters about his arrest on August 8, 1988.

Although the appellant had asked that criminal proceedings should be awaited, a departmental inquiry was held. The inquiry officer held him guilty of the charges on May 3, 1995.

He was afterwards discharged on June 14, 1996. In the meantime, in the criminal case, the appellant had been found guilty by the trial court, in April 1994, and acquitted of all charges by Additional Sessions Judge-X1, Patna, on February 16, 1996, on the basis that the prosecution had not proved its case.

The dismissal of the appellant was upheld on his internal appeal and he therefore approached the High Court by filing a writ petition.

Hearing in the Single Judge and Division Bench

During consideration of the Writ petition, the Single Judge of the Patna High Court determined that there were critical contradictions in the story given by the informant, as well as glaring issues with the Inquiry Officer using the testimony of PW-1, who could not even be cross-examined.

The Single Judge observed that there might arise a conflict of interest between the PW-1 and lashed the Inquiry Officer for failing to ensure that the appeal was given a chance to cross examine the witness. Based on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the past, the Single Judge extracted that the charges were vague and indefinite.

More importantly, the Single Judge underlined that the charges in a criminal case and in a departmental case were mostly the same and judging by the fact that the appellant was found innocent in the criminal case, the similar case should not have been pursued. In its turn, the Single Judge set aside the dismissal order and summoned reinstatement with all the subsequent benefits.

The order of the Single Judge was however, overturned in an appeal to the Division Bench which however dismissed the order of the Single Judge According to the Division Bench, the Single Judge had usurped its jurisdiction by re-appreciating evidence, a task usually left to an appellate court and that judicial review only seeks care of whether the decision was made or not and not whether the finding was right or wrong. The Division Bench concluded that the charges were specific and the procedural requirements were followed.

Fundamental Issues and the Supreme Court’s ANALYSIS

The Supreme Court identified four key issues for determination: the justification for dismissal given procedural due process, the vulnerability of disciplinary findings following a criminal acquittal on identical charges, the validity of the Division Bench’s judgment, and the relief due to the appellant.

One of the serious issues that was confronted by the Supreme Court was the failure by the respondent-the State of Bihar- to produce the full departmental file even after having been ordered to do so. The Court referred to Section 114(g) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 where it assumed that the evidence withheld would be against the State. This non-compliance proved fatal to the State’s case.

As to due process, the Court assumed that the then applicable rules were the Bihar and Orissa Subordinate Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1935, and that they required observance of Rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930.

According to Rule 55, allegations should be marked out in plain terms by giving clear allegations. Considering the inability of the State to submit the chargesheet, the Court held true the argument by the appellant that the charges were unclear and fitful thereby rendering the disciplinary proceedings perverse at the beginning.

One of the most important areas of conflict was the refusal to provide the appellant with the right to cross-examine a witness, PW-1. The Single Judge had noted the respondents’ claim that no written request for cross-examination was made, while before the Supreme Court, the respondents contended that the appellant chose not to cross-examine PW-1.

The Supreme Court held that such a change of position was unsustainable and that the appellant was in fact deprived of this fundamental right particularly on allegations of personal vendetta against PW-1. The Court strongly added that failure to allow a witness, whose evidence much depends on, to be cross-examined amounts to gross procedural error and that it is prejudicial.

The Inquiry Officer’s dismissal of PW-2’s cross-examination testimony, solely due to a nine-month delay, was also deemed unjustified. The Court stated that the prosecution was responsible for the delay, and findings must be based on legal evidence, not surmises or conjectures. Furthermore, the original complaint that initiated the proceedings was not proved as the informant was never examined as a witness.

The Supreme Court then addressed the issue of identical charges in criminal and departmental proceedings. Although conviction in a criminal proceeding is not conclusive of disciplinary proceedings, the Court reenacted the same principle as G.M. Tank (supra) and Ram Lal (supra) that in case charges, evidences, witnesses and circumstances are the same or substantially the same, affirming the disciplinary findings would be not fair.

No technicalities were used in acquitting the appellant in the criminal case but it was because the prosecution was not able to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt. The Court was of the opinion that the conviction in count no. 1 could not be upheld bearing in mind the acquittal in the criminal case under nearly identical circumstances.

Regarding charge No.2 Concerning Prior misconduct, the Court acknowledged that previous guilt could be considered for enhanced punishment, provided sufficient notice was given. However, this point became moot due to incurable defects in the overall disciplinary proceedings.

Charge 3 and 4 were also determined to be colorable because the appellant’s arrest on 8th of August, 1988, by default would not have allowed him to resume his duties or report to the Headquarters of the CID. The argument by the appellant that PW-1 deliberately did not report to authorities was malicious was likely to be true.

Conclusion and Relief Granted

The Supreme Court held that the court martial proceedings against Maharana Pratap Singh were not held in a manner that considered fairness and natural justice and it gravely affected his defense. As a result, the illegitimate decision of the Division Bench was overruled and dismissal ordered by the respondents as well.32

Though the Supreme Court partly affirmed the order issued by the Single Judge, it quashed the full back wages direction. The Court saw it best to give compensation given the fact that the appellant at the time of his/her dismissal was approximately 74 years old (according to the year 2025) and only had about 14-15 years of service to give when he/she was dismissed in 1996. Therefore, The compensation award was impossible.

The Court also ordered the lump sum of 30 lakh rupees (thirty lakh rupees, including all the service and retirement benefits) of the appellant to be paid within three months. Besides, costs of a sum of 5 lakh rupees (Rupees five lakh) were granted to the appellant.

The judgment is a good reminder of the need to follow due process and natural justice in imposing disciplinary action as in such situations, through internal inquiry, some basic rights of the accused cannot be ignored.